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INTRODUCTION
Since influenza may be prevented by
vaccine, development and successful
implementation of public health programs
to prevent spread of a potential avian
influenza strain relies upon vaccination as
a strategic cornerstone. Although both the
Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS)† and the World Health
Organization (WHO) highlight the role of
influenza vaccination as the core of an
effective prevention and control strategy,
should there be an avian influenza pan-
demic there is (at the time of this sympo-
sium) currently no available vaccine with
demonstrated efficacy against the H5N1
strain. Indeed, the recent focus upon
preparation for an avian influenza pan-
demic highlights many of the weaknesses
that are generalizable to the entire vaccine
development and supply system. This
paper will provide general background on
the fragility of the current vaccine devel-
opment and production infrastructure in
the United States and identify specific
challenges for vaccine suppliers in prepar-
ing for a potential influenza pandemic.
VACCINE DEVELOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION CONSIDERATIONS
Following the seminal 19th- and early
20th-century elaboration of microorgan-
isms as the cause of infectious diseases,
the middle of the 20th century witnessed a
period of tremendous scientific break-
throughs in combatting infectious disease.
The discoveries of penicillin and the sul-
fonamides to treat bacterial infections
were paralleled by major breakthroughs in
vaccines. The successful campaign to
develop a polio vaccine is perhaps the best
known of these, but effective vaccines
against influenza, measles, mumps, rubel-
la, yellow fever, and Japanese encephalitis
also were developed two to three genera-
tions ago.At the time, there was a buoyant
mood in the medical community that
infectious diseases could be largely van-
quished. In the late 1960s, U.S. Surgeon
General William Steward confidently
declared “it was time to close the book on
infectious disease” and move on to con-
trolling chronic diseases [1]. At the Yale
University School of Medicine itself, there
was so much optimism over the apparent
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Merck Research Laboratories, North Wales, Pennsylvaniaconquest of infectious disease that the fac-
ulty had decided to dispense with the study
of infectious disease altogether [2].
A critical weapon in the pending vic-
tory over infectious disease was vaccine
production. In 1967, there were 37 compa-
nies authorized to manufacture vaccines in
the United States [3, 4]. The large number
of manufacturers provided excess capaci-
ty, with some of the most common vac-
cines produced by several suppliers.
However, by 2002, this number had fallen
to 11. Presently, five companies manufac-
ture all pediatric vaccines. Three of the 13
pediatric vaccines currently recommended
in the United States are produced by sole
suppliers. The public health consequences
of the limited contingencies for supply
became apparent during 2002 and 2004,
when there were shortages of vaccines tar-
geted against eight of the diseases recom-
mended for vaccination, including diph-
theria, tetanus, pertussis, measles, mumps,
rubella, polio, and pneumococcal infec-
tions. In 2004, following persistent short-
ages of the conjugate pneumococcal vac-
cine, the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) took the extraordinary step of rec-
ommending vaccine rationing, suggesting
that the third and fourth dosages of the
normal four-dose regimen might be elimi-
nated, in order to provide partial vaccine
coverage to twice as many children [5].
Recent experience with the influenza vac-
cine also underscores the consequences of
the limited national vaccine reserve capac-
ity. In October 2004, at the beginning of
what would normally have been the begin-
ning of the annual U.S. influenza vaccine
campaign, international news headlines
informed the public that only one-half of
the planned vaccine supply would be
available: “U.S. flu vaccine supply halved:
health officials face record shortage as
Britain shuts down supplier [6].” At the
time, almost the entire U.S. influenza vac-
cine supply was produced by two manu-
facturers, one of which was found by the
British regulatory authority (U.K.
Medicines and Healthcare Products
Regulatory Agency) to have quality con-
trol concerns requiring that the production
plant be closed during the critical months
for the influenza season.As a consequence
of this shortage, the CDC again recom-
mended rationing available vaccine by tar-
geting immunization to groups at highest
risk for serious influenza infections [7].
While the 2004 influenza vaccine shortage
was well publicized, perhaps because of
the concurrent concern about sudden acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) and the gen-
eral public health anxiety about a global
influenza pandemic, influenza vaccine
shortages are not extraordinary. In fact,
just one year before the 2004 episode, vac-
cine suppliers also had been unable to
meet the anticipated demand [8].
Why is it that vaccines, which are cer-
tainly among the most important public
health interventions of the last century,
and whose successful implementation has
rendered age-old scourges such as small-
pox, diphtheria, tetanus, measles, and
polio largely into vague topics of passing
historical interest for most Americans,
have fallen on such hard times? Why are
there fewer manufacturers now than 40
years ago, and why, as public health offi-
cials look with trepidation at the prospect
of an influenza pandemic, is there limited
capacity in influenza vaccine production?
The explanation is multifactorial.
Firstly, there has been consolidation with-
in the industry. Nine companies are cur-
rently responsible for more than 85 per-
cent of all vaccine dosages sold in the
United States and Europe, as well for the
majority of vaccine sales in the rest of the
world [9]. Several of the largest manufac-
turers have absorbed other vaccine pro-
ducers into much larger corporations. For
example, Sanofi-Pasteur counts as its cor-
porate ancestors the Pasteur, Merieux, and
Connaught companies, each of which had
at one time been an independent vaccine
manufacturer. While the pharmaceutical
industry is large, it is still considered by
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the largest of companies controlling no
more than 10 percent of global revenues.
The major vaccine producers now reside
within large global pharmaceutical compa-
nies, which, as private companies, are ulti-
mately answerable to shareholders inter-
ested in returns on their investments.
Within these companies, drug-related rev-
enue dwarfs that of vaccines. It has been
estimated that annual global sales of vac-
cines are approximately $6.5 billion,
which represents only about 2 percent of
the global market for therapeutic drugs
[4]. During the 1990s, with the rise of indi-
vidual drugs generating more than $1 bil-
lion in annual revenue, it has been argued
that it was difficult for vaccine research
and development to secure resources to
commit to vaccine development in any-
thing like the magnitude available for new
drug development. Put another way, glob-
al sales of all vaccines produced in the
world are less than that of the single
largest-selling drug for hyperlipemia [10].
Acriticalfeaturedifferentiatingthevac-
cine from the pharmaceutical marketplace is
that more than one-half of all pediatric vac-
cine doses are purchased directly by the
United States government [11]. This type of
solepurchasingarrangement,ormonopsony,
creates an environment in which the pur-
chaser is able to exert much greater pressure
on purchasing price than is true for a typical
competitive economic market. In fact, when
the Institute of Medicine issued its report
evaluating the weaknesses in vaccine
research and development, it highlighted the
dominance of government vaccine purchas-
es as a key disincentive [11].
An additional reason for the decline in
vaccine manufacturers has been concern
about financial risk due to product liability.
Following a 1974 case report of paralysis in
a child who had received whole cell pertus-
sis vaccine [12] (a component of the diph-
theria, tetanus, pertussis, or DTP vaccine),
tort litigation lawsuits against vaccine man-
ufacturers began to appear, brought by
plaintiff’s attorneys seeking redress for pre-
sumed vaccine-related adverse events. In
1978, there was a single product liability
suit brought against DTP manufacturers.
Nodoubtfueledinpartbythemedia,which
offered up such provocatively titled fea-
tures as the documentary, “DTP Vaccine
Roulette” [13], there was a rapid escalation
in vaccine-related litigation during the fol-
lowing years; 255 diphtheria vaccine-relat-
ed lawsuits were filed in 1986 alone.
Concerns regarding legal exposure led both
to vaccine price increases and to the depar-
ture of several of the DTP manufacturers.
By 1984, spokesmen for Lederle, the sole
remaining DTP supplier, indicated that its
DTP-related legal liability exposure was
more than 200 times greater than its annual
sales of this vaccine [13].As a consequence
of what had become recognized as a vac-
cine availability crisis, congressional hear-
ings were initiated, leading to passage of
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation (NVIC) Act of 1986. This
act, funded by excise taxes on covered
pediatric vaccines, provides for persons
claiming vaccine-related injury to seek and
obtain redress for pre-specified injuries
considered (by independent experts) to be
plausibly linked, biologically and temporal-
ly, to administration of the vaccine. The
NVIC program provides an alternative to
tort litigation: claims are handled on a no-
fault basis, with damages capped per inci-
dent. While plaintiffs may continue to seek
compensation from manufacturers, they
cannot do so without forgoing compensa-
tion that would have been offered by the
NVIC program [14]. While the program
hasbeenconsideredasuccess,byproviding
just compensation to injured persons while
limiting the liability exposure of manufac-
turers, health care providers, and institu-
tions, it should be noted that only certain
vaccines qualify for coverage. Until 2005,
the influenza vaccine was not covered by
the NVIC program, potentially creating a
disincentive for developing innovative
H5N1 vaccines [15].
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been actively involved in vaccine research
and development, much of which was dri-
ven by the recognition that prevention of
infectious diseases is valuable in ensuring a
healthy military. The U.S. Army was the
first army in the world to be immunized
againstsmallpox[16].Governmentsupport-
edresearchwaswhollyorpartlyresponsible
for development of vaccines against yellow
fever, typhoid fever, and adenovirus, as well
as the meningococcus C vaccine — the lat-
ter notable for being the first subunit vac-
cine. DuringWorldWar II, the U.S. military
was actively involved in supporting clinical
trialsofthefirst(wholevirus)influenzavac-
cine formulation. Although there continues
to be global government investment in vac-
cines, for humanitarian as well as military
use, government-supported vaccine
research now accounts for a modest finan-
cial role in vaccine research and develop-
ment. Precise figures are difficult to obtain,
but in 2002, total global vaccine research
and development investment was estimated
to be $1.51 billion. Of this, approximately
90 percent came from the large vaccine
manufacturers. Only $40 million, or less
than 3 percent of global investment in
researchanddevelopment,camefromdirect
government support [9].
Additionally, new vaccines have
become increasingly more technically
challenging to develop. The earliest vac-
cines were crude preparations obtained
from donor animals. Vaccinia to prevent
smallpox, the progenitor of all modern vac-
cines, was, after all, derived from the
lymph of cattle that had been infected with
cowpox.Acentury after Jenner’s work, the
great breakthroughs in microbiology and
infectious disease by Pasteur, Koch, and
others led to development of vaccines uti-
lizing antisera obtained from livestock that
had been intentionally infected with organ-
isms such as tetanus and diphtheria bacilli.
Production of antisera was unregulated,
and indeed so casual that livery men in the
late 19th century used to bleed their horses
to supplement their income. In contrast,
current technologies to develop and pro-
duce vaccines are very sophisticated and,
in some cases, are on the leading edge of
immunologic research (Figure 1) [17]. One
example is the ongoing effort to develop an
HIV vaccine. Among the strategies to
develop a successful HIV-1 vaccine are
approaches involving use of replication-
defective viral vectors encoding HIV-1
consensus genetic sequences, direct inocu-
lation of HIV-1 DNA (so-called “naked
DNA”), and the recently completed
(though unsuccessful) trial of the recombi-
nant subunit gp120 capsular antigen [18].
Vaccines are typically derived from
pathogenic organisms that have been mod-
ified (through processes such as attenua-
tion, inactivation or isolation of antigenic
components) so that they induce immuno-
genic responses but do not cause disease.
To date, most vaccines have been devel-
oped for pediatric use (with influenza vac-
cine one of the exceptions). Unlike most
pharmaceutical products, which are usual-
ly given to treat disease, vaccines are usu-
ally given to healthy individuals in order
to prevent disease. These factors underlie
the paramount public health imperative
that vaccine development and production
occur with careful regulatory oversight to
ensure safety and efficacy. In fact, the gen-
esis of the Hygienic Laboratory of the
Public Health and Marine Hospital
Service (which is the antecedent of the
National Institutes of Health) occurred
(Biologics Control Act, 1902), as the
direct result of the tragic deaths of 13 chil-
dren who had been treated for diphtheria
with antisera later discovered to have been
contaminated with tetanus bacilli. In the
United States, the Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research is the division of
the FDA responsible for evaluating and
assuring the safety and efficacy of vac-
cines. Paradoxically, the success of vac-
cines in controlling and in some cases
essentially eradicating several of the most
deadly or disabling infectious diseases of
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decreasing tolerance for any risks associat-
ed with vaccines. The public expects vac-
cines to be perfectly safe, which both reg-
ulators and manufacturers recognize as a
worthy but perhaps unrealistic goal.
As biologicals, vaccines inherently
pose different challenges than drugs (which
are derived from chemical synthesis of
standardized molecular components) in
assuring their potency, consistency, stabili-
ty and safety.Vaccine production is careful-
ly monitored, with a rigorous emphasis
upon standardized procedures and well-val-
idatedassays[19].Thereisinherentlyaten-
sion between a regulatory environment that
is charged with ensuring that no vaccines
are introduced that have not been meticu-
lously assessed for safety and efficacy, and
a scientific culture that favors innovation
and is entrepreneurial [20]. Hence, some
older technologies have remained standard,
despite the availability of promising newer
ones. For example, although cell-based cul-
ture techniques have been developed for
influenza vaccine production, the only
approach currently approved is that of vac-
cine grown in hens’ eggs, a technology
developed more than 70 years ago.
This constellation of market, scientif-
ic, and regulatory forces has created an
environment favoring large-scale manu-
facturers, which currently stand alone in
having the resources needed to support the
physical infrastructure, the capability of
providing large scale production, and the
willingness to commit large amounts of
capital for long periods of time, comple-
mented by the necessary scientific (basic
and clinical research, manufacturing) and
regulatory expertise required to produce
vaccines. These factors have both favored
a concentration of vaccine manufacturers
and created formidable hurdles for new
entrants into the most established markets.
PANDEMIC INFLUENZA
The mounting global concern over a
potentially imminent global avian influen-
za pandemic underscores many of the chal-
lenges posed for vaccine manufacturers.
Until the emergence of HIV, influenza
virus was considered the model of a pro-
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Figure 1. Vaccine development technologies in historical perspective. Reprinted with
permission from Hilleman M. Vaccine 2000;18:1436-47. The number following several vac-
cines (e.g., Hepatitis A 96) refers to the date of its introduction.tean virus causing human disease. These
negative-sense RNA viruses are catego-
rized on the basis of core proteins into
three types: A, B, and C. Of these, type A
naturally infects a variety of avian and
mammalian species (including humans),
and is responsible for most human disease,
while types B and C are practically
restricted to human hosts. Types A and B
are defined on the basis of the neu-
raminidase (NA) and hemagglutinin (HA)
surface glycoproteins, which induce
immunologic response and provide the
basis for the current influenza vaccines.
HA (16 subtypes identified to date) is
involved in cell receptor binding and
fusion, and NA (nine subtypes identified)
has several functions, including viral tran-
sit, inhibition of viral aggregation, and
cleavage of daughter virus from infected
cells. Two major viral characteristics are
responsible for the challenges for long
lasting host control of infection and devel-
opment of durable influenza vaccines.
Like other RNA viruses, influenza viruses
are characterized by an absence of effec-
tive viral polymerase-associated proof-
reading, which results in a large number of
transcription errors, in turn leading to
progeny virus having heterogeneous
amino acid substitutions within the NA
and HAglycoproteins. Occasionally, prog-
eny virus with minor changes in NA and
HA have attributes favoring selection and
can successfully transmit and propagate in
humans. These minor changes within an
existing NA or HA subtype are termed
antigenic drift [21] and have important
consequences for human disease because
hosts previously exposed or vaccinated to
the ancestral subtype may incompletely
recognize the epitopes of viruses that have
undergone antigenic drift. Antigenic drift
is responsible for annual influenza epi-
demics. Due to its segmented genome,
influenza viruses may also exchange
entire genes with influenza viruses of dif-
ferent subtypes. This phenomenon may
also occur within intermediary hosts such
as domestic swine. When a reassortant
influenza virus, composed of the dominant
virus in circulation, but which encodes a
heterologous HA or NA gene, establishes
an ecologic niche in humans, this creates
the potential for severe disease, as most
human hosts have no preexisting immuni-
ty to the new HA or NA gene. This phe-
nomenon, “antigenic shift” [22], is
thought to occur approximately every
three human generations and is responsi-
ble for pandemic influenza. A very small
number of HA/NA influenza virus combi-
nations have become established in human
populations during the 20th century.Avian
influenza (H5N1 subtype) is of particular
concern because human populations are
immunologically naïve to this virus.
Due to ongoing mutations and incom-
plete host response to influenza viruses
that have undergone genetic drift, there is
ongoing global surveillance of circulating
human influenza viruses. This effort, coor-
dinated by the World Health Organization
(WHO), allows for the monitoring of
influenza trends by surveillance conducted
more than 80 countries. Participating cen-
ters collect specimens from patients hav-
ing influenza-like illness. Viral isolates
from those patients found to have culture-
proven influenza are then sent to one of
four WHO Collaborating Centres for anti-
genic and genetic analyses.Approximately
175,000 specimens are collected annually,
and around 2,000 influenza isolates are
identified and reviewed. In the United
States, the WHO data, along with data col-
lected from other organizations such as the
FDA, the National Institutes of Health, the
CDC, and the Department of Defense, are
reviewed by the Vaccine and Related
Biological Products Advisory Committee
(VRBPAC). During January through
March of each year, VRBPAC makes rec-
ommendations for influenza vaccine for-
mulation, based upon its assessment of the
most important emerging viral strains like-
ly to cause disease during the coming
influenza season. Influenza vaccine is typ-
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incorporating antigens from two influenza
A and one influenza B strain.
Approximately nine months are
required between identification of the rec-
ommended influenza virus strains and
vaccine availability for distribution. This
short interval presents a vaccine produc-
tion challenge for addressing annual epi-
demic influenza and may well be grossly
inadequate for a pandemic influenza strain
characterized by high virulence, accompa-
nied by large-scale vaccine demand and
complex distribution. Historically,
influenza pandemics have typically spread
with the speed of a “flash flood” [23]. As
shown (Figure 2), during the past 50 years,
influenza epidemics of particular concern
have required several months before large-
scale production begins, and maximum
vaccine production has typically fallen
short of demand. In 1976, although the
rate of production was ultimately rapid, an
interval of more than seven months
occurred before production began. Public
health officials are concerned that an avian
influenza pandemic might spread more
rapidly than earlier pandemics, such as the
1918 pandemic, due to increases in human
population density (including an increas-
ing proportion of older persons and per-
sons with medical comorbidities associat-
ed with increased risk of severe influenza),
which favors high mortality and rapid
transmission, and improvements in trans-
portation systems, which facilitates rapid
geographic spread of disease.
All current influenza vaccine commer-
cial production requires growing influenza
virus in embryonated hens’ eggs, a tech-
nology almost 70 years old. While this
approach obviously requires large-scale
egg availability, technical subtleties
include the need for standardized egg sizes
and shells to ensure efficient automated
production and recognition that an individ-
ual egg can only grow a single influenza
virus type. Due to the cost of maintaining
large-scale contracts with egg suppliers,
and the annual variation in demand for
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Figure 2. Influenza vaccine production during four pandemic/pandemic alert years,
relative to date of strain availability. Reprinted with permission from Wood JM [24].influenza vaccine, it has been advanta-
geous to delay contracting with poultry
farmers until as late as possible — which
creates a challenge in addressing vaccine
demand within the setting of a rapidly
moving pandemic. Although initial
influenza vaccines were formulated as
whole-virus preparations, these were asso-
ciated with increased reactogenicity and
have been largely replaced by split or sub-
unit vaccines, consisting of purified anti-
gens. A live attenuated cold-adapted virus
formulation (also using hens’ eggs as
growth substrate) recently has been
approved, which, it is hoped, may offer
greater immunogenicity than the inactivat-
ed formulations. It is important to note that
vaccine production technology has
improved substantially since the 1970s,
when reassortant influenza vaccines (pro-
duced by selection of influenza strains
optimized for cultivation, obtained from
eggs coinfected with target virus express-
ing appropriate HA and NA genes and
high-yield master virus strains) were intro-
duced. Reassortant technology was respon-
sible for the rapid scale-up of production
during the 1976 swine flu outbreak [25].
From a public health perspective, it
would be ideal if manufacturers were able
to provide a highly immunogenic vaccine
optimally targeted against the dominant
circulating H5N1 strain and for which vac-
cine production could be scaled up rapidly
as needed (assuming vaccine was not
already stockpiled). The complexity of
assuring appropriate quantities of eggs
currently represents a rate-limiting step in
vaccine production. Use of mammalian
cell culture as a viral substrate would, in
principle, allow for high volume influenza
vaccine production.To date,Vero cells and
Maden-Darby canine kidney (MDCK)
cells have been demonstrated to support
growth of influenza virus, but neither is
yet accepted by most regulatory authori-
ties out of concern that the cells might
contain some potentially injurious conta-
minant [26]. In fact, in 2003, global sur-
veillance indicated a shift in circulating
influenza virus strains, and some argued to
include antigen derived from the emerging
Fujian (China) vaccine strain. The deci-
sion was made not to do so, precisely
because the only available Fujian influen-
za virus strain had been grown in MDCK
cell culture [27]. Several approaches have
been proposed to enhance influenza vac-
cine immunogenicity, one of which
involves “reverse genetics,” producing
transfectant or recombinant influenza
viruses [28]. It has been argued that this
strategy would allow for rapid identifica-
tion and production of codon-optimized
strains that could serve as attenuated mas-
ter seed strains for vaccine production.
Webby et al. recently applied this
approach to develop a candidate reference
SARS virus (for vaccine production) with-
in four weeks of initial virus isolation, uti-
lizing Vero cells as substrate, and have
proposed that this method could be used
for production of H5N1 viruses [29]. At
present, most regulatory authorities do not
consider that they have sufficient informa-
tion to assure the safety and efficacy of
vaccines produced with the newer tech-
nologies and have not approved their use.
Hence production continues to be reliant
upon egg media as influenza viral growth
substrate. An additional hurdle is intellec-
tual property, as the newer technologies
are typically associated with intellectual
property rights, which represents another
obstacle in making these technologies fea-
sible for rapid deployment.
What preparations are being made on
the federal level that affect vaccine manu-
facturing? In 2004, HHS issued a draft
National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
Plan [30], which proposes a comprehensive
public health strategy to prepare for and to
control the impact of a potential influenza
pandemic. This includes enhancement of
surveillance capacity, stockpiling of antivi-
ral drugs, and elaboration of a public health
strategy aimed at disease control. Vaccines
play a central role, and challenges in vac-
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tion are explicitly discussed. From a manu-
facturing perspective, the plan recognizes
the need to actively develop and assess can-
didate H5N1 strains as vaccine candidates,
the potential value of tissue cultures to
grow virus (and overcome the challenges
with egg based media), and the promise of
recombinant technologies to engineer
influenza vaccine for maximal immuno-
genicity. It also recognizes the need for
proper evaluation of these technologies
before they can be utilized. Enhancing sur-
veillance capability, particularly in coun-
tries where H5N1 has already appeared,
holdsthepromiseofearlieridentificationof
a potentially pandemic virus strain, and
hopefully, a shorter time to large-scale vac-
cine production. In May 2004, HHS funded
two manufacturers, Sanofi-Pasteur and
Chiron Corporation, to manufacture candi-
date H5N1 vaccines for testing [31]. Initial
immunogenicity studies are ongoing, with
hopes that the vaccine will both be
immunogenic in low doses and require just
a single dose (so that the supply can be
stretched and to ease strains on the health
care infrastructure). Plans are under way to
stockpile millions of doses [32]. Hopefully,
too, stockpiled vaccine will remain highly
immunogenic against an emergent pandem-
ic strain that may be, due to genetic drift,
somewhat distinct from the H5N1 strain
used to prepare the stockpiled vaccine.
The HHS plan is reassuring in that it
recognizes the unprecedented need for vac-
cineintheeventthatanavianinfluenzapan-
demic appears imminent, and the efforts
being made to facilitate more efficient vac-
cinedevelopmentandproduction.However,
the plan expects that vaccine demand will at
least initially exceed supply. Challenges
remain.As for the coming influenza season,
which is expected to continue to be domi-
nated by a non-pandemic H3N2 strain, the
CDC has recently issued guidance on prior-
itization of vaccine based on the recognition
that there have been vaccine shortages for
three of the past five years and that it is
uncertain whether vaccine supply will be
sufficient for the current year [33].
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